become prime minister income inequality has fallen. those are the facts. one of the biggest things we are doing to help with income inequality, for the first time ever bring in a national living wage. this is the year that we are going to see people paying no tax until they've earned 11,000 pounds. this is the year we are going to see a national living wage of 7 pounds 20, those are big advances to helping the low paid in our country. >> thank you, mr. speaker. i would like to pay tribute to the countless numbers of people and organizations who helped out during the recent floods. yesterday i spoke with the chairman of the new insurance flood and i know that people have been hammered by the floods, will welcome the fact that their premiums and won't meet but he told me it's not going to cover any houses built

in 2009 and not cover businesses either, will the prime minister look to make sure it's comprehensive? ..

the very good visit to manchester airport. the point i would make is the middle order committee of this house and, indeed, the author of the original report, howard davis, have both said the problems of air quality to raise new questions that the government has to enter. i'm in favor of answering those questions and then making a decision. >> order. two years ago i think tomorrow, the house lost a superb parliamentarian and much loved colleague in all parts of the house, the honorable gentleman's predecessor paul goggins. we remember him with affection and respect and we also remember and think fondly of his widow and their children, matthew, teresa and dominic, who are all wonderful, human beings and we wish them well in the future. >> here, here.

>> thank you, mr. speaker as the prime minister knows my constituency was decimated by the recent floods. it was reported in the telegraph in august that the district would not receive any of the extra funding the prime minister announced for yorkshire. will they take this opportunity to confirm that that isn't the case, that whatever money is necessary to protect my constituency from future flooding will be spent? if you struggling to find the money perhaps he could use money from the overseas aid budget because i'm sure he believes fixing the blood should not be discriminated against in terms of victims of flooding and other parts of the world. >> let me say to my honorable friend we will do what it takes to make sure the families and communities and businesses can get back on their feet. that's why we've invested record sums more quickly into the area that are affected. we learned the lessons of previous floods were some kind of the schemes have been too bureaucratic, too much time taken. whether it is building new

bridges, whether it's repairing roads, whether it's building for flood defenses, whether it's examined with the water went this time and what more can be done we will make sure that work is carried out in bradford as well everywhere else. >> came to prime minister be aware of the valley of the work of the national wildlife crime unit not just enforcing all but promoting animal welfare and part of the international effort against the trade in endangered species? is he aware that funding for it expired in just a couple of months time? the home office has yet to make a decision to continually. can i ask them to provide us to make sure it's important invaluable work is continued? >> it's my understanding with cap the funding for this organization. it does important work both domestically and in terms of overseas. i'll look very carefully what he suggested i think there is a decision still debate about the decision that up till now we have about this organization

fully. >> mrfully. >> turned to my right honorable friend knows the legacy still hangs over, over 500 people in our country today. the last parliament, mr. speaker, the prime minister gave strong support to get fair, just solution to that problem. cannot invite my right honorable friend in this parliament to renew that pledge and work with the all party group to ensure that? >> i'm happy to make that clear. in the last parliament i met with some of my own constituents who had been affected and the number of things they wanted parliamentarian's to do and a lot of people got behind their campaign and i'm happy to continue to work with them in this parliament. >> order. [inaudible conversations] >> here on c-span2 relieve the british house of commons as members move on to other business. you've been watching prime minister's questions on the air the live when parliament is in

session. a quick reminder you can see this session began sunday nights at nine eastern and pacific on c-span. for more information go to c-span.org and click o on series to the of the program was aired from the british house of commons since october of 1989 and we invite your comments via twitter using the hashtag pmq pmqs. >> booktv is 48 hours of nonfiction books and authors of the weekend on c-span2 get here some programs watch for this weekend. >> this was a movement that was really going to the core of many people's beliefs about what is nation should be. and it could change a lot of minds but also seals allowed people to positions of hatred and their commitment to equali

equality. >> then james rosen who looked at the life and political career of former vice president dick cheney in his book. is interviewed by dana perino, former white house press secretary for the bush administration. administration. >> no one on the right has attracted more vitriol from the left, more intense vitriol from the left and dick cheney with the possible exception that many served in the white house george w. bush richard nixon. >> i started out writing personal essays. i only actually think if i publish pieces ever when i got the book deal, and people really liked them and had his delusional fantasy that since i'd written a 2000 word essay providing 100,000 word book would be like writing 52,

thousand page essays and that wouldn't be that hard. >> watch booktv all weekend every weekend on c-span2. on c-. television for serious readers. >> next discussion on u.s. efforts to counter isis and other terrorist groups. we'll hear from former cia and nsa director michael hayden and former deputy attorney general jamie gorelick. >> thank you very much. either. thanks for coming today. we have a full house in new york. i hope you have a full house in d.c. my name is dina temple-raston atlanta counterterrorism correspondent for national public radio so i've been busy. as has today's panelists watching what's been going on in paris and brussels and san bernardino. so what i'd like to do is

briefly introduce the panel and we will talk for a little while and then at 1:00 we will, sorry, at 1:30 p.m. we will go for questions from the audience so you get that ready. so here's sitting with me in new york is robert bonner, senior principal at sentinel strategy and policy consulting. is a former commissioner of u.s. customs. so we'll have lots of questions for him about visas and waivers and things like that. in d.c. we have jamie gorelick was a partner at wilmerhale, and the former deputy attorney general with the is department of justice. and, finally, almost a fixture here at the foreign relations we have the general michael hayden is a principal at the chertoff group and a former director of

the cia and the national security agency. we will have some questions about encryption and other things like that for him. let's start and we'll start in new york because we are live here. let's talk about the difference between large-scale attacks and the recent attacks we've seen in paris and in particular san bernardino. what kind of countermeasures can ameliorate something like san bernardino? >> let me start off by just saying we've got two different kinds of attacks that have taken place in the recent past. the one that spurred this program was for large-scale terrorist attack in paris. so i think with the assessment that i think we had already made but certainly should make is about isis is engaging in asymmetrical warfare against the country that it views as its enemies. it's not content just to stay within its territory in syria in

iraq, protect and expand the territory, and other territories within the middle east. it's not content just use the internet to help radicalized singleton lone wolf kind of terrorists that are in place in countries like the u.s., but that it is carrying out large-scale terrorist attacks on individuals who have been trained not only radicalized, but trained in warfare and terrorist tactics in syria and in iraq. of large-scale terrorist attack is want i would submit we need to be most concerned about, san bernardino i think it is an example, appears by the way very interesting article in the "new york times" today based upon the arrest of an acre and a better to the couple that carried out the san bernardino attack. >> the friend of syed farook.

>> yes. there it appears we would usher but it now appears clear that that was inspired terrorist attack, and by the way, inspired at least in part by al-awlaki into sermons and lectures coming out of the yemen over the internet the radicalized farook, and we're still not quite clear how ms. fink in exactly her journey to become a jihadists terrorist eric -- ms. malik. it is more of a large scale attack that it still managed by the way, they managed to kill which is a terrible tragedy, 14 people, but a large scale terrorist attack, like paris was at 130 people that were slaughtered. mumbai, madrid by the way 191 people, multiple simultaneous, well-planned terrorist attacks

executed by the way generally by a half a dozen or more terrorists. that presents the kind of terrorist attack that i would say this most consequential, and, therefore, we want to make sure we prioritize and focus our efforts as a government in with other governments on preventing that. obviously, we need to try to also prevent the san bernardino's, the chattanooga's, the garland, texas, and so forth. but i veggie chili by the way, at the end of the day no matter how good the fbi is, and they are good, if you're talking about singleton, lone wolf radicalized terrorists being able to kill a number of people, that's going to happen and it's extraordinarily difficult to prevent. i applaud the efforts of the bureau today in supporting as many attacks as it has. >> general hayden, quick question has to do with you see this distinction between cells

and lone wolf attacks your cell being paris, lone wolf something like san bernardino. are there ways to stop lone wolf attacks if, for example, a conversation about an attack are actually taking place over dinner in an apartment like was in san bernardino? >> you can reduce their likelihood. you can reduce the likelihood that even if attempted, even if successful, the number of fatalities is reduced. i agree totally. this is below a threshold at which you can at any realistic expectations that your law enforcement or security services can get this 20. these kinds of things will continue to happen. i think they are accelerated, turn one, by what we see in the middle east. you got the inspiration coming out of places. it's acting like a hand of god carrying out the will of god, and a narrative that is

genuinely underpinned by the battlefield successes. we are talking in our discussion a few minutes ago, in addition to whatever tightening we might become trouble with, and there's tightening we will not be comfortable with and should not do, but whatever tightening we may be comfortable with you, between the 18-yard line and the goal, we need to kick the ball up the field. we need to get the ball up in the offensive zone, rather than restructuring our society, let's do some reconstruction out of their. and this is a case where the physical destruction, the kinetic fight, actually has a powerful ideological impact. very often in my life experience kinetic success carries with it ideological burdens. it might make the long fight a little harder to do. industries i see convergence. imposing battlefield defeats on these folks undercuts their theological underpinning.

and, therefore, you get a victory not just tactically but strategically. one additional comment. i totally agree with the analysis that what happened in san bernardino is kind of what we were expecting from isis. kind of the "charlie hebdo" level. maybe "charlie hebdo" plot. paris was a little surprising or at least surprising to me. it showed a growth in isis ambition and sophistication and reach that was coming to address, frankly, at a rate faster than i had anticipated. it was a bit more al-qaeda like, in that it was centrally directed in complex with multiple parts. albeit al-qaeda like compared to what al-qaeda had done and would like to do. so in one sense we now have to deal with both and, the increasingly sophisticated, conflux attack. frankly, we are better at

stopping. and then the spontaneous attacks which actually might just be the cost of doing business. >> i agree with general hayden on one point. really on all those points but the one i would really underscore is this isn't just about defense. it's not about defending against these attacks. the best defense is a good offense. the offensive starters against isis of course as a subject for a whole nother program so we will be focusing on the fact that when you're on offense the you still have to prevent these asymmetrical attacks by the enemy that wants to strike in your homeland. that's what they're able to do against the french in paris. that's what isis was able to do against the russians by taking out a commercial airline over the sinai, and the like. that's the one we have a good chance of preventing the. we are doing better than most people think i think in terms of our ability to prevent that kind of attack in the u.s. there are undoubtedly room for

improvement. >> it's far from clear that san bernardino had anything to do with isis, beyond a posting on our facebook page just minutes after the attack but said in broken english that tashfeen malik supported and pledged support to al-baghdadi. the criminal complaint in this case is absolutely fascinating, and you see this almost all the up and filled something very typically al-qaeda. al-awlaki was in fall. aqap, one of the shooters wanted to go and join al-qaeda's arm in human. i think everybody was very brave to talk about this being entices case and we may find out it is a tangential one. one. >> i was in isis inspired appears what it to be at this point. or maybe even al-qaeda. >> i would go more with al-qaeda.

>> apparently tonight was radicalized as early as 2007. >> let's talk about the way you combat something like this. jamie, i want to ask you this question. there's some commentary on the role of the state department and whether or not they should be checking social media before they let somebody in the country. what are your views on the? >> something for study, but if you think we are surprising for a country that invented social media, not great at it. we are not great at surveying it and when not great at doing it. that's stunning to me that the enemy here is way better servlet using social media to foment and inspire, and we don't have, to use mike's terminology, a counter narrative. we don't have the same power in that space that we should. i don't mean to answer a question which was not the one

you are asking me, but the two go hand in hand. i think you have to have greater sophistication in government, help but operate sophisticated private sector to figure out what is happening out of there. as robert said, when you have an asymmetric war which is what we are in, and we said this in the 9/11 commission report, your best tool, your very best to is intelligence. you've got to use it where you can. you have to put proper boundaries on and the like but you have to use it. >> a couple years ago i was looking at the idea of dignity and intelligence. this was a little before the snowden revelations. this question is posed for jamie and for general hayden. how do you see big data analytics being used in this space? if you all these people and social media, if you have to

follow such a large but of information have been used to prevent these kinds of attacks? >> look, in this context, dina, the content a bit dated and i you want to use it, i think this follows the path will become disambiguation. you've got masses of data and you want to go from the universe of data points into their specific actionable things. we've gotten fairly good at that in terms of disambiguating identities so they can target some of these are action or four collection. so he or she doesn't get on an airplane. so we do that. we need to perfect that and use it better and expand it as part of the big data seek would be social media information to it's not a contrary view but a complementary one. an awful lot of what passes now for analysis and the american intelligence committee is

targeting. it is disambiguation to it's going from the mast to the specific to anything. that may be at the cost of broader strategic appreciation for what's going on. i said that aspen last year and i will paraphrase to become did you guys miss isis or what? it was probably a mix but i offered the view that we may been so busy as an intelligence community chopping down trees over here with great care in we were not chopping down the wrong trees, the weekend and missed the second forest coming up over here. big data is good but we've got to do that, perfect for disambiguation. when i hear that, but at the fact kicks in immediately. don't forget, you need to give your policymakers deep reach nuanced strategic appreciations so that you are not for ever in a loop where all your doing is arresting or killing people. >> let me add to that.

big data is being used by every american company to really great ends. we are capable of analyzing huge amounts of data, and citizens today generate huge amounts of data in a way that we didn't even years ago and certainly not 10 years ago. so the ability to analyze, to use machine learning, to keep ourselves smart about what is happening out there, whether it is a micro or the macro, is critical. we've got to use it. to be sure when the government start looking at lots of data, you know, alarms go off about what the protections are against the misuse of that data. i would rather focus on what the protections should be then say it's too dangerous and we should be hands off. because it is one of our key tools. and if we are blind to what is

buried in the data, we are not going to be as effective in protecting our country. as somebody who grew up in this community i would rather take the time to build a system that works improperly than i would risk, take the risk of not doing that and having the american people be so afraid that the wholesale civil liberties. we have to appreciate that when we talk about the massive pendulum swings we've had in this country between security and privacy. >> i'm not going to call this a big data but one of the most important things we did, and shortly after 9/11, was to essentially posit the question of how can we use data more effectively not we had to better identify the small fragment of people that may pose a terrorist threat to the united states,

might be tempted into the united states from abroad end of the terrorist threat? and, of course, you've got people on the terrorist watch list and we will identify anybody on the terrorist watch list, not only when they enter jfk but before they board an airplane. the real problem that i thought a lot about and what we did something about was the issue of how do you know down the haystack of those very really under 1% of people, and they are foreign nationals, some of them are now foreign fighters that are trained in syria, but how to identify the potentiality that someone might fall into that category and in use border surged authority in for questioning authority which is the broadest law enforcement agency, that's cbp. how to use that thing to engage those small fragment of people encounter sophisticated counterterrorism questioning to determine whether or not they,

in fact, impose a risk. if they pose a risk, to deny them entry into the united states. that's what we've been doing shortly cents after 9/11. that's using a lot of data, whether that's a big data, it's a lot of data for the automated targeting system which part of the national targeting center that was set up by borders and customs protections. not only can we identify the small fragment of people that may pose a threat and then ask them some questions before we allow them in the united states. if you're a foreign national you have no right to enter the u.s. that spoke of the people, either way, it's hundreds per year we deny entry which means they're put on an airplane and sent back. the other thing we're able to do now, and this has been since the underpants bomber, the call of australia, abdulmutallab, since that time we've been able to do this intervention before they get on an aircraft at a foreign airport like heathrow and so forth. cbp has teams of officers of their to do the counterterrorism

questioning of the people that we determine a potential terrorist, so the ability to get on board the aircraft if we assess them to be a security risk. we simply tell the airlines don't board that person, in fact, if they are a visa waiver person then have to go to the u.s. consulate to get the views and be subject to an actual interview, counterterrorism interviewed by state department officials. >> one of the things that surprised me post paris was out of such a debate about syrian refugees and then coming in, not just of euros but in this country as well. two of the terrorist attackers as far as we know allegedly came through greece possibly with fake syrian passports to coming. let me so with the general hayden just what i think i, about the last question as well adjudicative make. do we need to worry about the syrian refugees? >> let me do the other quick comment. what to do with big data and

american industry discovers many things. i was on a panel a year or two ago with keith alexander, and eric schmidt from google or quit talk about the innocent meta- database. eric which is going on said look, i understand why discuss what to do. you run powerful algorithms, establish relationships, learn this and that. on and on. keith and i look at one another and sent eric, you're right. we don't do that. the use of even that database was very narrowly circumscribed to simply query whether a known terrorist ever had a phone call that ended in the united states. so you've got this unreal separation with private industry takes as a given you do it this way. look, no, no. not so much. with regard refugees, sure, stupid along with being generous. my short summary would be simply that i would advise the chief

executive to speak like and act like mother teresa, and before the meeting broke up, to grab whoever is so much are now, poli-sci, focusing the into his sternum and say you, you make sure nothing bad happens. we can do both. we are talented, we've got talent at this. >> should we be worried about them? >> there is a danger. we should be prudent about it. just simply saying it ain't going to happen is actually constructed of our security. not just destructive of our character. >> this is another example of overreaction in our country, which we see after i think every terrorist attack. and congress almost always overreacts. it's axiomatic. but look, first of all, the fact, the significance think there were a couple of people

with syrian passport who came into europe that way. the fact of significance was that there were foreign terrorist fighters who were belgian citizens, citizens, french citizens, citizens of other coaches who thought they had been trained by isis and had european passports. they were able to go anywhere in the eu from any country. that's the more scary datapoint if you want to look for one of the refugees. the refugees were able, it's a long process. we are capable of hitting. it takes us to counterterrorisme counterterrorism questioning the it takes what general hayden said a president who tells the department of homeland security secretary, you know, make sure somebody that makes this entity threat doesn't get in. that process takes time. there is betting you. there's the opportunity to make sure that the refugees to admit

do not pose a security threat to our country. but the visa waiver program i think actually poses more of a threat because we had come to estimate our, 5000 western europeans, french, belgian, uk that have gone off to syria under fighting for places. me, some will be killed and that sort of thing but now we know isis is intent on sending some of these people back asymmetrically to attack countries in the west. so that's the more i think practical concern. i told you a little bit about the fact that we do have some protections in the visa waiver program. congress just strengthened these protections by making it clear to be offensive if they want to stay in the visa waiver program do have to share information with the united states, with u.s. authorities with respect to the own citizens of got off to fight with isis. they are going to have to have the capability of knowing who they are. that's an intelligence issue,

but by me just say i'm not impressed with what our eu colleagues are doing with respect even having the data that we need to protect not only them but ultimately to help protect the united states. >> they were not sharing the information before? >> there is some sharing but the fact is they don't, let me come if you're a german citizen and should been to turkey for six months, you come back into germany, they don't even though you've returned to germany. there's a random checking occasion of the passports and international airport of frankford of the own citizens or you could fly into france. you could be a german who was radicalized and training to there. i'm guessing they are so far behind in terms of actually having a system to protect their own borders, and it's not just -- our external borders which are protected are the weakest nations of the eu, greece and

bulgaria. the second largest land border ports of entry in the country, in the world is -- is between turkey and bulgaria. second largest by the way, for largest is on the mexican border with san diego. in the extra controls in terms of border controls and using port authority are almost nonexistent. they don't even have the data to share with us. >> the so-called brain behind the paris attacks was on a watchlist as one of the most wanted men in europe and taken back and forth several times between greece and was traveling between brussels and france. and germany. so that's an example. let's talk about encryption because maven seems he wanted to talk about into and encryption, not just in the same project is but also in the paris case. jamie, should phone companies be

required to respond? >> i think every citizen, that includes corporations, should be required to respond to process. i'm speaking personally. my law firm represents many technology companies, but we have legislated that in the leader which was a statute passed when i was deputy attorney general, and implemented within which basically said to phone companies you have to create the technical wherewithal so that if a court on a finding of probable cause says we need this information, that that could be executable. and right now what our technology companies are saying is that is commercially very problematic for us and, therefore, we are going to offer encryption across the board.

and it's true that come as you put it, telephone companies, that is, anyone in telecommunications, also any number of apps. this is a hard trajectory against which law enforcement is working and it's very difficult to in my view, it's not going to be perfect, but we should enable the people who are there to protect us to get information whether it is a lawful reason for getting it. everyone else should be free to keep their secrets. but bad guys, whether it is a child molester or a terrorist, should be able to other to haver communications discovered in a lawful process. >> summit with a slightly different view may be sitting next to you, but let me have -- >> ironic. >> he is vibrating.

general hayden, let me just sharpened the question a little bit and ask you, so the fbi director james comey said that he thought this wasn't a technological problem, the end-to-end encryption. it's possible to have a way you could search that. but, in fact, it's a business decision that silicon valley companies, just to pick on them, are making that as a business decision. can you talk about that? >> i think at the end of the discussion it's both. it's a combination of technology and business. the fact of the matter is, creating a door for the government to enter a technological level creates a very bad business decision on the parts of these companies because that is by definition we could encryption that would otherwise be available. so you really don't have to split the baby. both those realities, both those realities are true.

if i was james comey i would have his point of view, but i'm not at annapolis and i don't expect to be. this is more a law enforcement issue than an intelligence issue because, frankly, intelligence gets to break all sorts of rules anti-cheat and use alternatives path. i'm saying that is him speaking have on absolute terms but i guess i get his point of view. >> you get to break rules not in the united states that he is responsible for us. >> i got it, i understand that i'm trying to be a little sympathetic but it doesn't change my basic argument which are the following. listen, i don't think it's a winning it to attempt to legislate against technological process. i think we'll get to this place and the fact you choose to criminalize in the united states does not stop it from happening. that's when reality. i just don't think it's worth the candle. the second point of view is even in the security line, even in

the security link i think i can still win the argument. it's not as easy as that one. it's a much closer call, i get that. i think american safety and security and liberty is better secured with the highest level technological capacity of security medications, even though there is a cost to pay in terms of some specific law enforcement question. i'm joined in this by mike chernoff, former secretary of homeland security, and mike mcconnell, mike chertoff raises we don't normally require citizens to organize their lives for the convenience of law enforcement. mike mcconnell's point of view, mike flipped through chip, recall back in the '90s where we're going to guarantee that in the chip it would be a way in? might use this enlargement director comey is using. he lost. mike will tell you now, and thus began the greatest 15 years of

electronic surveillance in the history of the national security agency. we figured out ways to get around it. before any civil libertarians fear what to come up to me afterwards and get my autograph, all right, let me tell you how we got around it. both the data and metadata, all right? the art tools that we can use at that intelligence level, not easily available at the law enforcement -- >> i would just say that if you are responsible for domestic safety, it is a really hard argument to swallow but don't worry about it because we can find out outside attorney. number two, it's not true that we don't legislate to require people to organize themselves so that they can respond to it with all kinds of requirements on businesses that have to be able to respond to certain inquiries the law enforcement makes.

my view of that. >> let me just say i would include associate myself with the jamie gorelick view of this by the way. perhaps that's the old justice department background. we face a similar issue of, i was talking to jamie about it earlier, technology doesn't change the cell phone companies back, this is like only 15 maybe 20 years ago max, were building up their switches and are building it. the deputy portal for port authorized wiretaps, be able to intercept a phone call where there was probable cause to believe a crime had been committed or was being committed and that the use of the song was committing it. so this act, congress passed legislation that mandated that cell phone companies basically building portals for law enforcement use so they can access with appropriate court order and authority. so i'm telling you, look, if there is a potential terrorism

in the united states, we have probable cause to believe that terrorist is intimidation with another terrorist in yemen are someplace else in the united states and they're conspiring to carry out a terrorist attack in the united states, i want to be able to go present that evidence and get a tap on to the cell phone or those cell phones that are being used or the electronic communications that are being used to transmit those messages. i think with all due respect to general hayden who i greatly admire, the fact that we don't have that capacity now because there are internet companies who want to sell privacy to everybody, even to criminals and terrorists, is, if not outrageous, it is inappropriate. >> i guess the argument would also be that if we require united states companies to do it, it will be companies elsewhere that wouldn't. >> you mean other countries. i know the argument but i think

the chinese will do it anyway. >> the chinese are likely to do it as are the french and the germans. i don't think the mood in france right now is to hospitable to the notion that you can sell encryption technology that will prevent the french from exercising lawful process to get access to the information. let's see. >> i just have to take personal pleasure -- europeans are not in favor of really doing surveillance. >> me, to get i agree with that. there's something very satisfying about that. okay. i've been into all a bit of the question time for members like politics. as you stand up to ask a question, this is on the record and please wait for the microphone and speak directly into it. and then state your name and your affiliation.

and let me cite one question that is actually questioned and then jamie, give me a high sign if you'd like, will alternate between questioners. >> okay. let me start with this gentleman here in the front. >> i have one question. shouldn't the head of nsa by law be a civilian concerned by the senate, isn't this much too important a role with all due respect, much too important to leave to the generals? i believe that question to general hayden.

>> the director is confirmed by the senate. process to the armed services committee but it is a senate confirmation as are all three stars. there is no requirement for the director of the cia to be a civilian get an effect i was a director in uniform for i think 32 of the 36 months that i was director. and, finally, nsa beyond its initial being thin is also a combat support agency of the department of defense. that does drive in the direction of a uniformed officer. you are right ther that there me changes. right now most importantly the director of nsa is also the command of u.s. cyber command but i don't think i can continue for ever. it's not too much power. it's too much work. as cyber command matures then you will separate the two jobs,

at which point you might want to give some thought that you now have a cyber command affair with a uniformed 4-star. you might want to give some thought that breaking with tradition and using a career in as a civilian as director of nsa. i think there's room to maneuv maneuver. >> please, microphone over there. >> altria, george mason university. the panel began by arguing that we need to get off the defense to go onto the offense. but this is not just a u.s. crisis or even a european isis problem. it's a very complicated regional problem. in some respects what's happening in the u.s. and europe is the smallest element of the. what is going on the offense mean? >> there is a powerful connecticut has been kinetic

element on this. this is not just me with military experience. i firmly believe in this war that kinetic and the ideologic element are really conjoined in ways that i have not come with experience in terms of breaking the narrative, hand of god, will of god, join the conference will. beyond that though, let me a further down my politically incorrect routine here. i do think this is about islam. it's not about all of this on answer but not about all muslims but there is a serious struggle with one of the world great religions but it's not a struggle you and i can determine with our background. has to be resolved within islam. the finger to recognize, i think richard hall's approximation that this is islam's equivalent of the 17th century and a 30 years war and all that you could have a lot of elements of truth in the. i was heartene hard at this poio listen on "morning joe" to the

amber rudd ambassador to the united states who really talked about modern, moderate islam -- emirates. not just beating this guy down the creating a different vision for the islamic world. that's something we can't control or determine but to the degree we can support influence that's the one ticket. >> in the back there with a blue shirt. >> craig. general hayden stay we need to go on the offensive but wonder what that actually implies. we've got 10,000 troops in afghanistan an and desmond tutu. went 1000 in iraq. that was too many. that fashion in addition to the old pottery barn rule, if you break it you codepink we discovered the codepink we discovered that if an extensive amount of reconstruction required in these societies. we are prepared to take action then homeland are we prepared to take to make the kind of

commitments required abroad to stem this tide? >> let me give you a corollary. if it gets broken we appear to own it, all right? seriously. three models. the involvement of iraq when we broke it but we were really involved. didn't end up with the involvement in day before we tried to split the difference. that didn't happen per capita. involved in? >> guest: when we were there to present at all and it didn't end very happily either. how much we are or not involved in any play in the process. i do think, i am convinced the right number for the american residual force in iraq was not a round number. it was not zero. and not because of americans would sweep across in these devices but because the political commitment as americans represented kept the

court and some very powerful if no sectarian bottles. and once we were gone we allowed to set things in motion that were not a father we did not create, move them in the direction we are now in. there's no one in my experience other than maybe lindsey graham calling for american maneuver units into syrian desert. but 3500 underresourced overregulated and lake geneva american forces is not the solution. there are many choices between the iraq occupation and what we are doing now that i actually thinthink the racial chance of making the situation better, although it would've been easier to make the decision easier to make the situation better one year ago, two years ago, three years ago or four years ago. the only bright side i can give is its ease of to do today then it will be a year from now.

>> i do want to engage in the beauty of hindsight and all that, but i do think if we are concerned about asymmetrical attacks in the united states a large-scale terrorist attacks, and our allies, i think we should be, then it's very important that the u.s. played a role in defeating isis in its own territory. and i think the are a lot of like-minded countries, including a good many sunni arab countries, that share our interests. france and the uk and even russia. so i think the real key here is how do we, can this be done? i ask you, can it be done without u.s. leadership? i believe that as a rhetorical question. but if it can't, i mean, we have to engage and have to have a broad strategy and with a lot of other countries lead the effort

to essentially remove crisis. astrolabe was saying, it's important to defeat them and remove them because it also, part of their inability quite frankly i think to attract and finance themselves about surfing is the fact that they are holding a sizable chunk of territory in syria and incorrect or i think we do need to do something about it but it's a question that is being debated and worthy of debate. >> jamie, or the other questions? >> that are. people are literally jumping out of their seats. >> we bemoan the fact that there's this insidious persuasive power of this confluence of an extremist narrative that social media. end user earlier how we are failing up outside. here's my question to you. we know in communications it's a big myth that there's one message peppers with everybody,

otherwise bernie sanders and trump followers would all be on board for the same message. we look with inside the great spectrum that we are talking about in terms of creating a counter narrative, what have you learned so far from big david, from intelligence and from your experience works and doesn't work as an effective counter narrative? >> i would answer that question this way. i'm not the expert on what the counter narrative is and i'm not convinced that we in the u.s. government are taking advantage of the best minds in the united states to develop that counter narrative or to implement it. was my point in my worry. we are operating as if we don't have the best lines in the country, in the world, on big david and on media. really it was no more than that. i do think that the anti-muslim rhetoric is a disaster for our national security and the have to be able to figure out how to get our message conveyed in a

way that underscores our values. when we wrote the 9/11 commission report we talked a lot about the benefits of leading with our values. and we are just not doing that with all the tools in the toolbox. so i don't have the answers but i do know that we are not getting the input from the right places and, as mike says, you know, we shouldn't be done. here we are dumb. we are not being smart about using those tools. that's the only point i wanted to make. we've got a couple of the questions you. can i go to a second one? speed and we have a couple, after quite a number here. >> go ahead. we will come back. go ahead. >> how about this gentleman in the blue tie?

>> hi. american heart association. and hello. my question is given the experience on the panel, we will have a new administration coming in in a few months, and what will be the organizational changes he would recommend to an incoming president that you think are a big priority, the threats that we are confronting and the organizational structure we have evolved? what would be the advice you would give to them? >> i thought i would start, jamie. jamie. i actually involved in the biggest reorganization of our common sense post-world war ii which was the homeland security organization. i confess to be, present immigration but not necessary responsible for every decision that was made.

i think there actually is a question in my mind whether or not we needed to restructure as massively as we did. but at this juncture having done it and not want to go through another reorganization, i would not suggest any message or send it to get reorganization of the department of homeland security or its alignment with the justice department and other agencies. there are questions, for example, why wasn't the fbi the principal counterterrorism agency domestically? what is in the department of homeland security? there are some practical, interesting reasons for that are not going to go into the now. the fbi should be in dhs budget is, for a lot of reasons that's not going to happen. there is one small item i would say and that is with customs and border protection was created which was the merger of all the front-line border agencies for the united states to form one single border agency, for our

country. and by the way, does make us more effective and efficient in terms of discharging the function. but when that was done the same thing all of the special agents, investigators if you will a u.s. customs, were taken out and removed from customs and border protection and put into an agency called i.c.e. it was a little bit my analogy and i see the commission in august, my analogy is a little bit like taking the new york police department, separate off the detective unit of the nypd and then expecting them to work well together in terms, and they do need to work well together. so that isn't working for what i think we ought to look at the issue of essentially reintegrated the office of investigations, the detectives back into customs and border protection. >> jamie? >> let me just say two things. one is i think that our instinct to reorganize the boxers every

time something goes wrong is not a great one. i was there at the question of the energy department. i watched the creation of homeland security. i understand why each of those occurred. you know, i think we need to examine everything because it does set back quite a bit the execution against mission when you do that. i think that the creation of the director financial intelligence after some spots has been quite effective. i would change that. is what i would do. we talk a lot about private public partnerships. we do not do them very well. our national security sits on the bed of privately held assets, and we basically left of those privately held assets on their own. the are implemented here and there, but we don't protect them and we don't utilize them in a real partnership.

we have to get over the notion that private is private and public is public, and figure out mechanisms i which we can help each other in both sectors. we have been miserable at it, and that has caused all manner of vulnerabilities in our society that i think could be fixed if people who are experienced, people of good will put their minds to it. >> i will reinforce what jamie just said. this is beyond the dotted line. i should be a solid line in terms of organizational charts. i think we're fundamental challenges even with a new flavor of security threats to our security establishment was hardwired in 1947, and get harvested all of the lessons very well, harvested all of the lessons of the last great adventure conflict in history. we are hardwired to defend you against malevolent state power and we just spent 52 minutes

talking about current dangers and never whispered anything to do with malevolent state power. we are badly organized in a world in which we find ourselves to reinforce jamie's point, we even have the wrong people in the room. because we have a traditional power ministries in the room you got intelligence community of the department of defense now tasked with doing things that i will be on their wheelhouse. >> and against their nature. >> i think, again, by the way, i really appreciate, my guess is okay, yours was a problem, okay. [laughter] i agree we don't need to be moving boxes around. the fundamental approach to security and we are designed to go here at the threats are coming this way. all the argus with having with ourselves, frankly have been about trying to adjust the

sickest outfit going this way and the get go this way, kill the enemy. met and they were. what does that look like? targeted killing. capture. what does it look like? guantánamo. why don't you interceptor those committee patients. that will be cool. learned their intent. what's that? everything we've told you that for two and half years. the arguments were having with ourselves have to do with our beginning attempts to restructure and national security apparatus designed to do one thing, and apply it to another. long-term project but critical to final success. >> do you have a suggestion on how to fix it? >> not yet. [laughter] >> we have another question here in d.c. [laughter] >> i want to address your question what our counter message is. i think there's only one.

it's sustaining the moderate muslims who reject violence because people talk to them about -- that's not a good conversation starter with extremists. but you said that's what the prophet really sick. you can get at least i bought in. what they're not doing it because the state department they someone court case is not about what to do with religion and instead it says you have to sell them. we organization i would suggest would allow them to work. allow me one more since. i'm surprised people talk about the chinese going to make end-to-end encryption. i wonder how many americans want to rely on a chinese not putting a backdoor or try to hold up the into and description to the light and see disclosure? >> they will put end-to-end encryption in places formally and overtly has a backdoor any. but does